Working Papers
Who Gains When Neighborhoods Rebuild? Redevelopment, Sorting, and Housing Affordability
-- previously circulated as ''Redevelopment and Gentrification in General Equilibrium''
Updated Draft: October 2026
Abstract
How does housing supply affect affordability and welfare when new housing replaces the existing stock? We document that redevelopment upgrades housing quality without adding units and raises neighborhood housing prices and average income. We then develop a dynamic spatial model with forward-looking landlords renovating or redeveloping a depreciating stock, income sorting across neighborhoods and housing qualities, and endogenous neighborhood amenities. We estimate the redevelopment elasticity using quasi-experimental variation from an anti-redevelopment policy in Chicago. We find that redevelopment lowers rents for high-quality housing yet raises rents for low-quality housing. Restricting redevelopment in gentrifying neighborhoods leaves all but the poorest households worse off and shifts redevelopment to untreated low-income neighborhoods. Endogenous amenities shape the local and city-wide effects of redevelopment and of policies seeking to reduce housing costs.
Global Ripple Effects of Corporate Tax Reforms
Updated Draft: July 2026
NBER Working Paper No. 34627. Accepted to the 2026 Joint BIS-BoE-ECB-IMF-JIE “Global Spillovers Amid Shifting Policies” Conference, with invited submission to a special issue of the Journal of International Economics
Abstract
We analyze the cross-country spillover effects of corporate tax reforms. Combining firm-level evidence on the 2017 U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) with a quantitative general-equilibrium model, we show how multinational enterprises (MNEs) propagate local policy shocks throughout the global economy. Our framework emphasizes three properties of intangible capital: non-rivalry, mobile ownership, and technology spillovers. We find the TCJA generated positive outward spillovers: First, it boosted U.S. MNEs' intangible investment, raising their foreign subsidiaries' output. Second, it increased tangible investment of foreign MNEs' U.S. subsidiaries, incentivizing them to expand intangible investment at home. Conversely, a Global Minimum Tax (GMT) in the rest of the world generates negative inward spillovers for the United States. It raises the effective tax rate on U.S. MNEs' foreign income, depressing their intangible investment, while simultaneously reducing foreign MNEs' intangible investment and thus their U.S. subsidiaries' output. These findings illustrate the complex trade-offs between tax-base protection and real economic activity in an interconnected policy environment.
Scalable versus Productive Technologies
Updated Draft: April 2026
Abstract
Are larger firms more productive, more scalable, or both? We use firm-level panel data from thirteen countries and employ a broad set of methods to estimate factor elasticities--capturing returns to scale (RTS)--and total factor productivity (TFP). We find substantial RTS heterogeneity within industries, with larger firms exhibiting higher RTS driven by greater intermediate input elasticities. TFP, by contrast, rises with firm size only up to the top decile before declining. Incorporating RTS heterogeneity into a standard model of entrepreneurship more than doubles the efficiency losses from financial frictions compared with a conventional calibration with only TFP differences.
Two-Sided Sorting of Workers and Firms: Implications for Spatial Inequality and Welfare
-- previously circulated as ''Two-Sided Sorting and Spatial Inequality''
Updated Draft: March 2025
Awarded Bank of Canada Graduate Student Paper Award, European Economic Association & UniCredit Foundation Best Job Market Paper Award, and Canadian Labour Economics Forum Best Paper Prize
Abstract
High-skilled workers and high-productivity firms co-locate in large cities. In this paper, I study how the two-sided sorting of workers and firms affects spatial earnings inequality, efficiency of the allocation of workers and firms across cities, and the welfare consequences of place-based policies. I build a general equilibrium model in which heterogeneous workers and firms sort across cities and match within cities. I structurally estimate the model using Canadian matched employer-employee data and decompose the urban earnings premium, finding that worker and firm sorting account for 67% and 27% of this premium, respectively. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient as low-productivity firms overvalue locating in high-skilled cities. The optimal spatial policy would incentivize high-skilled workers and high-productivity firms to co-locate to a greater extent while redistributing income towards low-earning cities, leading to a 6% increase in social welfare. Model counterfactuals underscore the importance of two-sided sorting when evaluating distributional and aggregate outcomes of place-based policies.
Understanding the Urban Earnings Growth Premium
Updated Draft: March 2024
Abstract
It has been documented that larger cities foster faster earnings growth, which is an important driver for cross-sectional spatial earnings inequality. In this paper, I empirically investigate the sources of the urban earnings growth premium. I find that the between-firm and within-firm growth components each explain 66% and 34% of the greater returns to big city experience, respectively. Workers do not move between jobs more frequently but enjoy a steeper job ladder in larger cities. Faster within-firm learning in larger cities is mostly explained by better learning environments at the firm level. The empirical results highlight the important role of firm heterogeneity across cities in explaining the dynamic gains from working in bigger cities.
Publications
A Macroeconomic Perspective on Taxing Multinational Enterprises
Journal of International Economics, Volume 152, November 2024
Abstract
We develop a general-equilibrium model to study the macroeconomic consequences of international profit shifting by multinational enterprises (MNEs). In our model, MNEs shift profits by exploiting intangible capital transfer pricing rules, which makes intangible investment more attractive and leads to higher output at home and abroad. We use the model to quantify the effects of two reforms proposed by the OECD (i) reallocating MNEs' profit tax bases to the countries where they sell their products; and (ii) a minimum global corporate income tax. Both reforms would reduce profit shifting substantially, but (i) would reduce global output whereas (ii) would have little macroeconomic impact. The reforms' distributional implications would also be important. In high-tax countries, tax revenues would increase more than output declines, raising gross national income and enabling redistribution that could offset lower wages. In contrast, output and tax revenues would both drop in low-tax countries, significantly reducing national income.
Optimal Taxation of Multinational Enterprises: A Ramsey Approach
Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 141, January 2024
Abstract
What is the optimal design of the international corporate tax system? We revisit this classic question in a multi-country general equilibrium model that incorporates three key features of the modern globalized economy: multinational production; intangible capital; and international profit shifting. Our model's competitive equilibrium is inefficient due to an externality that arises from international spillovers in intangible investment. In the absence of profit shifting, there is little, if anything, a Ramsey planner can do with corporate income taxes to improve the allocation of intangible investment across countries. However, profit shifting allows the planner to use corporate income taxes to internalize the externality and achieve an efficient allocation of intangible investment. To quantitatively investigate the properties of the Ramsey planner's optimal policy in a more realistic setting, we extend our model to an environment with firm heterogeneity and selection into multinational production. Without spillovers, it would be optimal to shut down profit shifting as much as possible. With spillovers, it would be optimal to allow MNEs to continue to shift profits, and if the planner is restricted to Pareto-improving policies, it would be optimal to allow even more profit shifting than under the status quo.